The choice is not between this tax and shutting down transit. The money to keep trains and buses running already exists inside the budgets the region is pouring into capital megaprojects. A no vote forces a better plan.
Before any of this, start with the money already on the table. In fiscal year 2024-25, Bay Area transit operators took in roughly $6 billion in tax, toll, and government grant support across the five counties, before a dollar of any new tax and on top of the fares, parking, and advertising they also keep. The proposed SB 63 tax would add about $1.05 billion a year, roughly one-sixth more, to a system that is already heavily subsidized.
| Operator | FY2024-25 support |
|---|---|
| VTA (Santa Clara) | $1,707M |
| BART | $1,632M |
| SFMTA / Muni | $1,422M |
| All other operators (AC Transit, Caltrain, SamTrans, ferry, small East Bay) | $1,481M |
| Total | ~$6,242M |
California spends roughly a billion dollars a year of cap-and-invest revenue on a high-speed rail project that will not carry a single Bay Area commuter and will not even serve the Central Valley until the 2030s. A portion of that money can be redirected to keep existing Bay Area buses and trains running today, where riders actually need them.
The region is also committed to two enormously expensive capital projects: BART's Silicon Valley Phase II extension into downtown San Jose, and the Portal, Caltrain's downtown extension to the Salesforce Transit Center in San Francisco. Pausing or reconsidering these megaprojects would free committed state and local dollars that could instead fully fund operations during the current shortfall. Operations are what keep service on the street; another tunnel does not help a rider whose line just got cut.
This tax runs for fourteen years. That is long enough for the technology and economics of transportation to change completely. Driverless trains and buses are moving from pilots to deployment. Services like Waymo already operate across the region and can cover low-ridership routes far more cheaply than a near-empty bus. Remote and hybrid work have permanently reduced peak commuting. Committing taxpayers to today's cost structure for fourteen years risks paying, well into the 2030s, for a system designed around the world of 2019.
A no vote also creates leverage to demand the reforms the agencies have avoided: merging overlapping agencies to cut administrative cost and management pay, replacing the lowest-ridership routes with subsidized on-demand service, transferring historic and specialty services to private operators, increasing the use of part-time operators, reducing layers of management, and creating a genuinely independent inspector general for Bay Area transportation. None of this is in the measure. All of it should come before another 14-year tax.
With operations bridged in the near term, planners would have time to design a measure sized to a realistic, post-pandemic ridership picture rather than to projections that have never come true. That means a smaller ask, tied to binding reforms and to honest population and ridership forecasts, instead of a rushed citizens' initiative built to pass with a simple majority before the hard questions are answered.
Sources: California Air Resources Board cap-and-invest expenditure reports; California High-Speed Rail Authority business plans; VTA BART Silicon Valley Phase II and Caltrain Portal project pages; and the SHIFT Bay Area analysis, The Transit Bail-Out Sales Tax: Fixes Before Funding (2026).